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PRECEDENTIAL 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 17-2886 
_____________ 
 
G.S., a minor, by his parents, J.S. and E.S. 
 
v. 
 
ROSE TREE MEDIA SCHOOL DISTRICT 
(E.D. Pa. No. 2-16-cv-04782) 
 
ROSE TREE MEDIA SCHOOL DISTRICT  
 
v. 
 
E.S. and J.S., Parents and Natural Guardians of G.S., a Minor 
(E.D. Pa. No. 2-16-cv-04849) 
 
Rose Tree Media School District, 
   Appellant 
_____________ 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Nos. 2-16-cv-04782 & 2-16-cv-04849) 
District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno 
______________ 
Argued June 4, 2018 
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______________ 
Before:  AMBRO, JORDAN,  
and VANASKIE,* Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: November 6, 2018) 
 
Gabrielle C. Goham, Esq. 
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* On November 6, 2018, the panel issued a not precedential 
opinion in this matter authored by the Honorable Thomas I. 
Vanaskie.  Judge Vanaskie retired from the Court on January 
1, 2019.  After Judge Vanaskie's retirement, amici curiae filed 
a motion to issue the opinion as a precedential opinion which 
was considered by the remaining members of the merits 
panel.  Today, the Court has issued the opinion as a 
precedential per curiam opinion.  See 3rd Cir. I.O.P. 12.1 (d). 
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OPINION   OF  THE  COURT 
______________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Appellant Rose Tree Media School District (“Rose 
Tree”) appeals the District Court’s grant of summary judgment 
concluding that Rose Tree was obligated to enroll Appellee 
G.S. under Subtitle VII-B of the McKinney-Vento Homeless 
Assistance Act (“McKinney-Vento” or the “Act”), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 11434a(2) and § 11432(g)(3)(A)(i).  We agree with the 
District Court that G.S. satisfies the Act’s definition of youth 
homelessness because he has been living in his maternal 
grandmother’s home, along with his parents, ever since his 
parents lost their home in November 2014.  Accordingly, we 
will affirm. 
I. 
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In 2010, G.S., along with his parents, his two sisters, 
and his paternal grandparents, moved into a rental home within 
Rose Tree.  At the time, G.S. and his sister, S.S., attended 
schools within Rose Tree.  In November 2014, G.S.’s parents 
were unable to make payments and lost the home.  As a result, 
G.S. moved in with Ba.S., his maternal grandmother.  The 
grandmother’s single-family, 1500-square-foot row house was 
located outside of Rose Tree.   
With the addition of G.S., a total of ten people—five 
adults and five children—resided in the grandmother’s home.  
Initially, G.S. slept in the living room with his parents and two 
sisters.  At times, G.S. moved his cot to the kitchen or basement 
to obtain some privacy.  The parties agree that, to date, G.S.’s 
living conditions remain unchanged.   
Rose Tree immediately learned of the change in G.S.’s 
living conditions.  At that time, Rose Tree deemed G.S. and 
S.S. homeless and thus continued to enroll them in a manner 
consistent with its obligations under McKinney-Vento, 
42 U.S.C. § 11432(g)(3)(A)(i).   
In January 2015—less than two months after G.S. 
moved in with his maternal grandmother—he was involved in 
a disciplinary incident at school.  Rose Tree suspended G.S. for 
three days, extended the suspension to ten days, and threatened 
him with expulsion.  G.S.’s parents challenged Rose Tree’s 
actions.  The parties resolved the matter pursuant to a written 
Settlement Agreement.  Rose Tree, for its part, agreed to pay 
for G.S. to attend a school outside of its jurisdiction for the 
2015–16 school year.  In exchange, G.S.’s parents agreed to 
waive all claims through August 31, 2016.  The Settlement 
Agreement also included a provision purporting to waive 
G.S.’s right to claim homelessness after the 2015–16 academic 
year.   
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Pursuant to the Agreement, G.S. attended a school 
outside Rose Tree for the 2015–16 school year.  Following the 
conclusion of that academic year, in July 2016, G.S.’s parents 
notified Rose Tree of the family’s intent to re-enroll G.S. in 
one of its schools for the 2016–17 academic year.  Rose Tree 
refused to enroll G.S., reasoning that his parents had waived 
his right to claim homelessness and thereby enroll under 
McKinney-Vento.   
G.S.’s parents initiated state grievance proceedings.  
After conducting an inquiry, the Pennsylvania Department of 
Education issued a determination letter, stating:  
the outcome of our investigation is 
that [G.S.] . . . ha[s] the right under 
the federal McKinney-Vento 
Homelessness Act to continue 
being educated in the Rose Tree 
Media School District since it is 
[his] school district of origin and 
[he] is temporarily residing in a 
doubled up living situation that is 
not fixed, regular nor adequate. 
(App. 365.)  G.S.’s parents again attempted to enroll G.S. in 
Rose Tree, but the School District again refused.  
 Throughout the pendency of this matter, Rose Tree 
continued to enroll G.S.’s sister, S.S, in one of its schools.  The 
parties do not dispute that S.S.’s living conditions are identical 
to those of G.S.  
 G.S. and his parents filed suit in federal court, Case No. 
16-4782, against Rose Tree, seeking enrollment.  Rose Tree 
filed a separate lawsuit in federal court, Case No. 16-4849, 
against G.S.’s parents, seeking a declaration that it was not 
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obligated to enroll G.S.  The District Court consolidated the 
two cases in February 2017.  Both parties moved for summary 
judgment.  The District Court resolved both motions in a single 
order, finding in favor of G.S.  Rose Tree timely appealed.  On 
appeal, the Education Law Center, the Homeless Children’s 
Education Fund, the National Law Center of Homelessness and 
Poverty, and the People’s Emergency Center appear as amici 
in support of G.S. 
II. 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1331.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.  We exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
grant of summary judgment.  Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 
767 F.3d 247, 265 (3d Cir. 2014). 
III. 
Rose Tree argues that the grant of summary judgment 
in favor of Appellees was erroneous because:  (1) G.S.’s 
parents waived his McKinney-Vento rights for the 2016–17 
academic year in the Settlement Agreement; (2) G.S. is no 
longer “homeless” within the meaning of the Act; and (3) 
enrollment in Rose Tree is not in G.S.’s “best interest.”   
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A. 
As a threshold matter, we must determine whether 
G.S.’s parents waived his McKinney-Vento rights in the 
Settlement Agreement.  The parties agree that Pennsylvania 
law governs our interpretation of the Agreement.  Under 
Pennsylvania law, “[t]he fundamental rule in contract 
interpretation is to ascertain the intent of the contracting 
parties.”  Ins. Adjustment Bureau, Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 905 
A.2d 462, 468 (Pa. 2006) (internal citation omitted).  “In cases 
of a written contract, the intent of the parties is the writing itself 
. . . When the terms of a contract are clear and unambiguous, 
the intent of the parties is to be ascertained from the document 
itself.”  Id. (internal citations omitted).  
In relevant part, the Settlement Agreement includes a 
provision purporting to waive G.S.’s McKinney-Vento rights 
for the 2016–17 academic year.  This provision states: 
Parents agree that they will make 
no claim of homeless status after 
the 2015-16 school year and that 
the District will have no further 
obligations to Student after the 
2015-16 school year. 
(App. 140.)  The District Court concluded that the waiver was 
unenforceable for lack of consideration.  We agree. 
Under Pennsylvania law, consideration is an essential 
element of a valid contract.  See Taylor v. Stanley Co. of Am., 
158 A. 157, 158 (Pa. 1932); see also Johnston the Florist, Inc. 
v. TEDCO Constr. Corp., 657 A.2d 511, 516 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1995).  In addition to the waiver provision excerpted above, the 
Settlement Agreement includes a provision titled “Adequate 
Consideration.”  This provision states: 
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Adequate Consideration. The Parents 
specifically acknowledge and agree that the 
District’s agreement to make the above 
payments is intended to and does provide the 
Parents with sufficient consideration for a 
settlement and compromise of any and all 
outstanding education and discrimination claims 
that they may now have or have had, whether 
known or unknown, from the beginning of time 
through August 31, 2016. The Parents also 
expressly acknowledge and confirm that: (1) the 
only consideration for their signing of this 
Agreement consists of the terms and provisions 
stated herein; and (2) no other promise or 
agreement of any kind, save those set forth in this 
Agreement, has been made by any person or 
entity whatsoever to cause them to sign the 
document. 
 (App. 141) (emphasis in original).   
Rose Tree argues, in conclusory fashion, that the family 
received “adequate” and “substantial consideration for all of 
the promises made . . . .”  (Appellant’s Br. 6.)  G.S. and his 
parents counter that the “Adequate Consideration” provision of 
the Agreement expressly limits consideration to claims arising 
before August 31, 2016, and thus any waiver of claims 
concerning the 2016–17 academic year lacks consideration.  
(Appellees’ Br. 11–12, 15–16.)  As the District Court 
concluded, the clear and unambiguous language of this 
provision states that consideration was only provided for 
claims through August 31, 2016, which pre-dates claims 
arising out of the 2016–17 academic year.  Accordingly, we 
agree that any purported waiver of claims arising after August 
31, 2016 lacks consideration and is unenforceable.   
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B. 
 Next, Rose Tree contends it need not enroll G.S. 
because he is no longer “homeless” within the meaning of the 
Act.  Subtitle VII-B of the Act, “Education for Homeless 
Children and Youths” (“EHCY”), addresses the educational 
barriers faced by homeless children.  EHCY preserves the right 
of equal access to a “free, appropriate public education” 
independent of a child’s housing status.  42 U.S.C. § 11431(1). 
Specifically, under this subtitle, local education agencies are 
required to continue a homeless child’s education in his or her 
“school of origin” for the “duration” of his or her homelessness 
if doing so is in the child’s “best interest.”  Id. 
§ 11432(g)(3)(A)(i).  Notably, there is no statutory limit on the 
duration of homelessness.   
Whether a child is eligible under EHCY is determined 
by the Act’s definition of youth homelessness, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 11434a(2).  In relevant part, this definition provides: 
The term “homeless children and youths”— 
(A) means individuals who lack a 
fixed, regular, and adequate 
nighttime residence (within the 
meaning of section 11302(a)(1) of 
this title); and 
(B) includes— 
(i) children and youths who 
are sharing the housing of 
other persons due to loss of 
housing, economic 
hardship, or a similar 
reason; . . . 
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Id. § 11434a(2).  Children who satisfy § 11434a(2)(B)(i) are 
often described as living “doubled up.”  See U.S. Dep’t of 
Educ., Education for Homeless Children and Youths Program 
Non-Regulatory Guidance, 5 (2016), 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/leg/essa/160240ehcyguidan
ce072716.pdf. 
There is no dispute that G.S. satisfied § 11434a(2) when 
he first moved in with his maternal grandmother.  Rather, the 
question is whether G.S. continues to satisfy this definition 
almost four years later.  Rose Tree argues that G.S. no longer 
lacks a fixed, regular, and adequate nighttime residence due to 
the fact that his doubled-up living arrangement has persisted 
for several years.  We are not convinced.   
First, Rose Tree’s interpretation is inconsistent with the 
plain meaning of the statute.  There is no dispute that G.S. 
continues to satisfy § 11434a(2)(B)(i), which is listed as a 
specific example of youth homelessness.  Second, the Act does 
not impose a limit on the duration of homelessness.  This 
undermines Rose Tree’s argument that a doubled-up 
arrangement can transform into a fixed, adequate, and regular 
nighttime residence if it persists long enough.  Third, Rose 
Tree fails to cite any authority other than general provisions of 
the Act and the dictionary for its interpretation.  This is 
unsurprising—to date, no court has adopted Rose Tree’s 
interpretation.  Fourth, several circumstances particular to this 
case persuade us that G.S. is eligible for coverage.  Rose Tree 
initially treated G.S. as homeless, and the parties agree his 
living arrangements have not changed.  It is also compelling 
that Rose Tree has continued to enroll G.S.’s similarly situated 
sister, S.S., throughout the duration of this matter.1  And 
                                              
1 Although S.S. is enrolled, the record is unclear as to 
whether Rose Tree still considers her to be homeless within the 
meaning of the McKinney-Vento Act.  (App. 292–93.)  At oral 
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finally, the Pennsylvania Department of Education determined 
that G.S. remains homeless.  Although we are not bound by the 
Agency’s determination, we think it is well-reasoned and, 
therefore, instructive.  To remove G.S. from the protections of 
the Act under these circumstances strikes us as nothing short 
of arbitrary.  Accordingly, we agree that G.S. continues to 
qualify as homeless for purposes of enrollment in a Rose Tree 
school.
C. 
Finally, assuming G.S. qualifies as homeless, Rose Tree 
argues it need not enroll G.S. because enrollment is not in his 
best interest.  It raises this argument for the first time on appeal 
and thus we need not consider it.  See Caisson Corp. v. 
Ingersoll-Rand Co., 622 F.2d 672, 680 (3d Cir. 1980).  
Nonetheless, we take a moment to reject this argument on its 
merits. 
A school district is required to enroll a homeless student 
so long as doing so accords with the child’s “best interest.”  42 
U.S.C. § 11432(g)(3)(A).  It is presumed that the best interest 
of the student is to remain in his or her school of origin unless 
doing so is contrary to the request of the parent or youth.  Id. 
§ 11432(g)(3)(B).  School of origin “means [either] the school 
that a child or youth attended when permanently housed or the 
school in which the child or youth was last enrolled, including 
a preschool.”  Id. § 11432(g)(3)(I)(i). 
 Here, all of the statutory considerations align to suggest 
enrollment in Rose Tree is in G.S.’s best interest.  Rose Tree 
hosts the school where G.S. was enrolled when he became 
                                              
argument, the School District took the position that while S.S. 
was homeless at the start of the 2016–17 academic year, she 
may not be homeless currently.   
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homeless; the school where G.S. was last enrolled; the school 
where his sister attends; and the school where he and his 
parents seek enrollment.  Under these circumstances, we 
conclude that continued enrollment in Rose Tree is in G.S.’s 
best interest. 
IV. 
For these reasons, we will affirm the order of the 
District Court dated July 31, 2017. 
